

world's greatest deliberative body; do your absolute best to serve this Nation with honor and decorum; and strive to keep the U.S. Senate the proud, historic and distinguished body of government it has been since the birth of this blessed Nation.

As I close out my public service career, I again thank my constituents, my colleagues, my staff and my family. May God bless each of you, the U.S. Senate, and God bless the United States of America.

I love all of you, and especially your wives.

#### EXHIBIT 1

##### SENATOR STROM THURMOND STAFF LIST

Duke Short, Chief of Staff and Administrative Assistant.

Holly Richardson, Executive Assistant.

Mark Ivany, Personal Assistant.

Eliza Edgar, Assistant to the Chief of Staff.

Erin Goodin, Receptionist.

Walker Clarkson, Receptionist.

##### PRESS/PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Becky Fleming, Press Secretary.

Emily Dorroh, Press Assistant.

##### RECORDS

Les Sealy, Office Manager and Systems Administrator.

David Black, Assistant Office Manager.

##### PROJECTS

Bill Tuten, Projects Director.

John Hawk, Projects Assistant.

Kevin Smith, Projects Assistant.

Michael Bozzelli, Projects Assistant.

Melissa Kiracofe-Low, Projects Assistant.

##### GENERAL LEGISLATION

David Best, Legislative Director.

Ernie Coggins, Legislative Assistant.

James Galyean, Legislative Assistant.

Helena Mell, Legislative Correspondent.

Ashley Hurt, Legislative Correspondent.

##### MILITARY CASEWORK

Matt Martin.

##### JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, FEDERALISM AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

Scott Frick, Chief Counsel.

Melinda Koutsoumpas, Chief Clerk.

##### ARMED SERVICES

George Lauffer, Military Assistant.

##### PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE, EMERITUS

James Graham, Staff Assistant.

##### THURMOND STATE OFFICES

Columbia: Warren Abernathy, State Director; Jeanie Rhyne; Valerie Gaines; Lind Morris; Michelle Quinn; and Christie Humphries.

Aiken: Elizabeth McFarland.

Charleston: Patricia Rones-Sykes.

Florence: Raleigh Ward and Kathryn Hook (Volunteer).

#### RECESS

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the hour of 12:30 having arrived, the Senate stands in recess until the hour of 2 p.m.

Thereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the Senate recessed until 2 p.m. and reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer (Mr. REID).

#### HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002—Resumed

##### AMENDMENT NO. 4694

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from

Connecticut is recognized for 7½ minutes.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I am pleased to urge adoption of the amendment offered by Senator McCain and ask that the vote be taken by the yeas and nays.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator asking for the yeas and nays on the amendment?

Mr. LIEBERMAN. That is correct.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second?

There is a sufficient second.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I rise to discuss briefly my vote on the September 11 Commission. I joined in the amendment proposed by my good friends from Connecticut and Arizona because it is the right thing to do. Sitting as I do on both the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, it has become clear to me over the past year that many different causes contributed to the horrific terrorist attacks on September 11. I have become convinced that we need to take a hard look at how this tragedy happened in order to better understand how we might avoid a similar tragedy in the future. hindsight is, indeed, 20-20, and we may be able to profit from a detached and objective analysis of mistakes that may have been made in the days and months before that attack. We need to learn from our mistakes. The stakes are simply too high to bury them.

While I believe that a September 11 Commission should be appointed, I also think that the administration should have some voice in its makeup. The amendment establishes a 10-member commission with all of the 10 members appointed by the majority and minority leaders of Congress. It is fitting that Congress play a large role in defining the membership of this Commission, but it is striking to me that the Administration has no voice at all. Just as this Commission was approved by strong bipartisan support, so too should its task be apolitical. In this spirit, I would call upon my colleagues to think seriously about providing the administration with some role in defining the Commission.

Mr. KYL. Mr. President, as a member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, I have had reservations about creating an outside commission to investigate 9/11 as called for in this amendment. My reservations have essentially been twofold: First, the Intelligence Committees were given the responsibility to look into this very matter, so an additional investigation would be duplicative and place additional stress on our intelligence community at a time when its resources should be dedicated to fighting the war on terrorism.

Second, we had every reason to believe that the joint committee investigation would do its job that is, find out what went wrong, why it went wrong, and how we can reform the intelligence community to try to prevent future such failures.

Sadly, it appears that the joint committee will fall short of that goal. In the Intelligence Committee, I have expressed serious reservations about the direction of the investigation, including the allocation of time and resources to holding premature open hearings.

Last week, the joint committee held public hearings in spite of not having completed its investigation. In fact, what was presented last week was only a staff document, not a consensus product of the committee. Members had no practical input into this interim report.

The interim statement from the joint inquiry staff provided information about what has been done to date, a chronology of events leading to the September 11th attacks, and some background information about al-Qaida. This history may be useful, but it does not address the questions that are fundamental to this investigation.

In the committee, we heard from more than one witness that at least some of the problems in the intelligence community stem from a bureaucratically and politically-induced culture of risk aversion and/or an inadequate allocation and improper prioritization of resources. Yet, it is not evident that the joint committee inquiry is serious about pursuing these fundamental questions.

For these and other reasons, it will be difficult for me to concur in the final joint committee product without reservations. We will not know what we haven't been told. Therefore, we will not be able to vouch unequivocally for the final product.

And, of course, these are the very questions that have led to calls for the creation of a national commission to investigate these matters, and, hence, to this amendment. Reluctantly, I have come to the conclusion that it is necessary. If its work starts after the Joint Intelligence Committee investigation has concluded, there should be no duplication or additional stress on the entities required to cooperate in the investigation.

Mr. President, because of the inadequate course being taken by the Joint Intelligence Committee investigation, and because the imposition of that investigation on our intelligence apparatus will be ended by the time this commission begins its work, I will support the creation of the commission.

Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, I have had the chance to speak about the urgent necessity of this independent commission to review the causes of the tragic events of September 11. It responds to the public interest by creating the best possible Department of Homeland Security to close the gaps that existed prior to that. The joint intelligence committees have done excellent work that led to disclosures that cry out to us for further investigation by our intelligence apparatus—and some other aspects of our Government that created the vulnerabilities which